Abstract. Khudra is a 18-round lightweight block cipher proposed by Souvik Kolay and Debdeep Mukhopadhyay in the SPACE 2014 conference which is applicable to Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs). In this paper, we obtain 2 16 14-round related-key impossible differentials of Khudra, and based on these related-key impossible differentials for 32 related keys, we launch an attack on the full Khudra with data complexity of 2 63 related-key chosen-plaintexts, time complexity of about 2
know attacks. Differential cryptanalysis [7] and linear cryptanalysis [8] are two of the most basic and effective attacks on block ciphers. Based on differential cryptanalysis a bunch of variants of differential analysis have been developed, such as related-key attack [9] , truncated differential attack [10] , boomerang attack and impossible differential attack [11] . Those attacks are chosen plaintext attacks based on a differential distinguisher which uses pairs of plaintexts.
Impossible differential attack, which was independently proposed by Biham et al. [11] and Knudsen [12] , is one of the well-know attacks on block ciphers. With its development, there are several approaches have been proposed to derive truncated impossible differentials of block ciphers/structures effectively such as the U-method [13] , U ID-method [14] and the extended tool of generalized upon to the former two methods by Wu and Wang proposed in Indocrypt 2012 [15] . Unlike traditional differential cryptanalysis, impossible differential attack starts with finding an input difference that result in an output difference with probability 0. It is an attack that aborts wrong key candidates by searching the plaintextciphertext pairs which meet the input and output differences of the impossible differential. Related-key attacks [9] allow a cryptanalyst to choose appropriate relation between keys and then to predict the encryptions under these keys. Related-key impossible differential attack [16] is a combination of the two above attacks.
Our Contributions. Based on the generalized Feistel structure of the block cipher Khudra, we obtain 2 16 related-key impossible differential characteristics for the 14-round Khudra. By adding two rounds before and after the impossible differentials respectively, we propose a related-key impossible differential attack on full Khudra, with data complexity of 2 63 chosen-plaintexts, time complexity of about 2 68.46 encryptions and memory complexity of 2 64 . Organization of this paper. In Section 2, we briefly describe the Khudra block cipher. In Section 3, we obtain 14-round related-key impossible differential characteristics and propose the related-key impossible differential attack on the full Khudra. Finally, Section 4 concludes this study.
Description of Block Cipher Khudra

Notation
The following notations are used in this paper: P i : the i-th 16-bit of 64-bit plaintext, 0 ≤ i < 4; C i : the i-th 16-bit of 64-bit ciphertext, 0 ≤ i < 4; ∆X: the XOR difference of X and X ; ∆I bitwise exclusive OR (XOR); x||y: bit string concatenation of x and y; ∆F i r : the XOR difference after the i-th F-function of the r-th round, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2.
Description of Khudra
Khudra is a new lightweight block cipher using "Generalized type-2 transformations" of Feistel Structure (GFS) on 64-bit blocks and 80-bit keys. The cipher has 18 rounds that each round has two 16 × 16 F -Function. The structure of the cipher is depicted in Fig.1 .
Fig. 1: Structure of Khudra
The F-function The F-Function has a similar structure used in Khudra, i.e., the same 4 branch type-2 generalized Feistel Structure. It uses 12 copies of a 4 × 4 S-box to provide non-linearity, see Fig.2 .
The S-box Khudra uses the S-box of the block cipher PRESENT for its higher algebraic degree and low differential and linear probability [17] . The S-box is given in Table 1 . 
Algorithm 1 Key Scheduling
RCi ← {0||i (6) ||00||i (6) ||0};
4:
RKi ← k i mod 5 ⊕ RCi; 5: end for 3 Related-key Impossible Differential Attack on Full Khudra
In this section, we describe a related-key impossible differential attack on the full Khudra. We first give the related-key impossible differential characteristics, and then give the attack on the full Khudra in detail.
Related-key Impossible Differential Characteristic of Block Cipher Khudra
According to the key schedule of Khudra, the difference values of round-keys are cyclic, that is, ∆RKi = ∆RKi mod 5. Assuming that one of the 5 16-bit keys have a difference ∆ (in our attack, the difference just is ∆k 0 ), we obtain the 14-round related-key impossible differentials, the details are given in Fig.3 . With the input difference ∆input = (0, 0, 0, ∆k 0 ) and the related keys difference ∆K = (∆k 0 , 0, 0, 0, 0), we deduce that ∆I 
Related-key Impossible Differential Analysis on Block Cipher Khudra
With these 14-round related-key impossible differentials on rounds 3-16, we can attack full Khudra. This is clarified in Fig.4 . Choosing N r = 32 related keys by some strategies, we can obtain
2 /2 ≈ 2 9 different values of ∆K = (∆k 0 , 0, 0, 0, 0) i.e. difference of related-key. We call the 32 related keys as K (i) , 0 < i ≤ 32.
-Data Collection Phase. For a fixed difference of key, by expanding two rounds before and after the 14-round impossible differential path respectively, we deduce that the plaintext difference is ∆P = (∆P 0 , ∆P 1 , ∆P 2 , ∆P 3 ) = (∆k 0 , 0, * , * ) For each K (i) , we construct corresponding N s structures of plaintexts. In each structure the 32 bits in (P 0 , P 1 ) are fixed and other 32 bits are traversed. Thus we get N r × N s × 2 32 chosen-plaintexts. 
Supposing K is the right key, two related keys are related-key differences, we do Step 1 to Step 5 as follows.
-Step 1. For each structure, the values of (P i 0 , P 1 ) and (P j 0 , P 1 ) are fixed. Thus for every k 0 we do as following:
(a) Calculate the value of ∆F 
Step 2, by looking up the table we get k 3 . Similarly, there is one expected solution of k 3 for each pair, thus for each k 0 ||k 1 ||k 4 ||k 3 the number of remaining expected pairs for a structure is 2 −16 × 2 −16 = 2 −32 . -Step 5. If we find a right pair for the guessing value k 0 ||k 1 ||k 4 ||k 3 , we delete the corresponding subkey k 0 ||k 1 ||k 4 ||k 3 in table D. -Step 6. For other differences of related-key ∆k 0 , we repeat step 1 to step 5.
Ultimately, for each survived candidate in Table D , we compute the seed key by doing an exhaustive search for other 16 bits.
Complexity Analysis. Recently, Boura et al. [18] proposed a generic vision of impossible differential attacks on block ciphers. In their method, they split the cipher in three parts:
(resp. E 3 ) with probability 1 to obtain ∆ in (resp. ∆ out ). Thus the differential (∆ X ← ∆ in ) (resp. ∆ Y ← ∆ out ) is verified with probability 1/2 cin (resp. 1/2 cout ), where c in (resp. c out ) is the number of bit-conditions that have to be verified to obtain ∆ X from ∆ in (resp. ∆ Y from ∆ out ).
Let ∆ X (resp. ∆ Y ) denote the input differences of the impossible differential, ∆ in (resp. ∆ out ) denote the set of all possible input (resp. output) differences of the cipher, r in (resp. r out ) denote the number of rounds of the differential path (∆ X , ∆ in ) (resp. (∆ Y , ∆ out )), and r ∆ denote the number of rounds of the impossible differential.
According to the method of calculating complexity in [18] , we get the results of data complexity, time complexity and memory complexity as follows.
-Data Complexity. In our work, ∆ in = ∆P , ∆ out = ∆C and c in = c out = 32. It follows that for a given key k 0 ||k 1 ||k 4 ||k 3 , a pair of plaintext-ciphertext already satisfying ∆P and ∆C, the probability that it is the right pair is 2 −cin × full-round encryptions and a memory complexity of 2 63 .
In this paper, we obtain 2 16 14-round related-key impossible differential characteristics. Using 32 related keys, we proposed a related-key impossible differential attack on the full Khudra by respectively extending 2 rounds backward and forward, with a data complexity of 2 63 chosen plaintexts, a time complexity of 2 68.46 full-round encryptions and a memory complexity of 2 64 .
